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Abstract 
 
 This paper reviews the literature on the impact of ethnic diversity on economic 
development. Ethnically polarized societies are less likely to agree on the provision of 
public goods and more likely to engage in rent seeking activities  providing lower levels 
of social capital. Initial conditions are important determinants of adverse development 
outcomes.  The role of decentralization, democracy and markets as potential remedies are 
discussed.  The paper then presents a number of preliminary hypotheses on the 
relationship between diversity and instability in order to stimulate future research. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
 There seems to be a general consensus, based on both cross-country regressions 
and individual country studies, that ethnic diversity, especially in the Sub-Saharan 
African context, is one of the causal factors behind relatively poor development 
performance.   While much of the past relevant literature focuses on diversity’s impact on 
economic growth, we also have evidence that it adversely affects income distribution, 
poverty as well as human development.  But much less is known about the impact of such 
diversity on economic stability or instability in Africa, which is the main focus of this 
activity. 
 It is generally accepted that more than two thousand ethnic groups, generally 
lacking the ability to exit from that condition, find themselves in Sub-Saharan Africa, a 
fact which can be taken as exogenous, although some have expressed the view that land-
locked conditions may have contributed to such marked ethnic diversity.  There is also 
agreement that it would be a mistake to talk about “the” African economy without 
distinguishing at least between natural resource rich country cases, coastal cash crop 
exporters, and the land-locked, internally oriented, economies, each encompassing 
approximately one-third of the total population of Sub-Saharan Africa.   
 We intend to proceed as follows:  In section II we summarize some of what seems 
to be known in the literature with respect to the impact of diversity, however defined, on 
development.   In section III we present some preliminary hypotheses about diversity and 
economic volatility.  Finally, in section IV, we will briefly summarize and suggest some 
research priorities. 
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II. Diversity and Development 
 Following Barro’s lead,1 some people have detected no unique African 
explanation for Africa’s poor performance but blame it all on poor policies, the well-
known violations of Washington Consensus strictures, including the lack of openness, 
low savings rates, flawed monetary and fiscal policies, as well as lack of access to the 
sea, a tropical climate, Dutch disease, corruption and sometimes even the kitchen sink.  
Sachs and Warner,2 for example, follow this line of thinking.  On the other hand, Paul 
Collier,3 as well as Collier and Gunning4 and Easterly and Levine5 point to the 
importance of ethnic diversity.  Collier and Gunning, for example, claim that ethno-
linguistic fractionalization (ELF), accounts for 35% of the growth shortfall in Sub-
Saharan Africa, or for 45% if closely linked poor policies are included6.  José Garcia-
Montalvo and Marta Reynal-Querol7 prefer polarization as the measure of diversity of 
greatest relevance in most country cases but share the general view of the importance of 
diversity’s impact on growth.8   
The main argument being put forward by such authors as Easterly and Levine is 
that polarized societies can’t agree on needed public goods and are more likely to engage 
in rent-seeking activities.  Collier9 similarly points to ELF as reducing trust, increasing 
                                                 
1 Barro, Robert J., 1991.  
2 Sachs, Jeffrey D & Warner, Andrew M, 1997.  
3 Collier, Paul, 2007.  
4 Collier, Paul, & Gunning, Jan-Willem, 1999.  
5 Easterly, William & Levine, Ross, 1997.  
6 ELF is measured by the probability that two randomly chosen individuals in a given country don’t belong 
to the same ethnolinguistic group. 
7 Montalvo, Jose G. & Reynal-Querol, Marta, 2005.  
8 Polarization is measured by the degree of homogeneity within groups, the degree of heterogeneity across 
groups, plus, most importantly, the small number of similarly sized groups.  
9 Collier, Paul, 1998.  
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transactions costs and adversely affecting development generally.  Bates10 does not 
embrace the ELF measure in the same way but agrees to emphasize that contacts and 
contracts, implicit or explicit, within groups, can be quite strong and promote both human 
capital and human development within but not across groups.  Habyarimana et al11 
provide a framework for examining ethnic versus rival explanations for the lack of 
collective action. 
 Most specialists on the subject seem to hold the view that Africa’s generally low 
population density makes it difficult to generate the kind of trust which crosses ethnic 
boundaries that is required for the provision of public goods.  Frequent human contact 
ensures the creation of the required social capital.  Individuals as well as entire clans tend 
to look at each other and worry about patent inequalities, vertical as well as horizontal, 
rather than about their absolute levels of welfare. It is in this sense that, in ethnically 
divided societies, each group has its own egalitarian impulse, but that impulse does not 
extend across ethnic lines, either by virtue of insurance or altruism.  This is in sharp 
contrast to the case of some of the more densely populated countries of Asia, where land 
scarcity and labor abundance have led to cooperation across ethnicities, especially in the 
case of intensive agriculture.   
 It is also true that strong, within-group loyalty hurts growth in another way, i.e. it 
does not pay for the individual member of a clan  to be a stand-out, i.e. do well or get 
promoted if this results in the rest of his extended family descending on him.  Alesina et 
                                                 
10 Bates, Robert H., 2000.  
11James Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Dan Posner and Jeremy Weinstein, 2009,   
Coethnicity : diversity and the dilemmas of collective action , New York : Russell Sage Foundation. 
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al12 favor the ELF, while Reynal-Querol,13 as well as Esteban and Ray,14 prefer the 
concept of polarization, a closely balanced, therefore, contested, ethnic majority 
dominance.   
 There are findings in the literature that low levels of ELF as well as very high 
levels do not pose as much of a threat to development as intermediate levels. Others 
conclude that we should really be counting much more on polarization when two 
contending parties are very close in terms of their power, which may lead to bad policy 
and bad development outcomes but also to less stability.  The correlation between 
fractionalization and polarization is apparently positive and very high at low levels of 
ELF but zero or even negative at intermediate and high levels.  But we will not spill 
much ink here on the question of how diversity is best measured; it clearly depends on 
the empirical reality and the question being asked.15 
 While many authors have discussed the underlying causes of adverse 
development outcomes, lots of issues are still open for discussion, and some of these are 
by no means irrelevant to the basic question to be addressed in this project.  Issues still 
open for debate include the importance of initial conditions, including colonial heritage, 
natural resource endowment, the role of institutions, broadly defined, as well as the 
relevance of the extent of democracy (or lack thereof) in affecting the relationship 
between diversity and growth. 
                                                 
12 Alesina, Alberto, Devleeschauwer, Arnaud, Easterly, William, Kurlat, Sergio & Wacziarg , Romain, 
2003.  
13 Reynal-Querol, Marta, 2002.  
14 Esteban, Joan & Ray, Debraj, 1994.  
15 See Graham Brown and Arnim Langer, 2009:  “Conceptualizing and Measuring Ethnicity,” JICA 
Research Institute Working Paper, forthcoming. 
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With respect to the initial conditions, the relative abundance of land and the low 
level of population density have already been referred to. While we are ready to accept 
kinship relationships as exogenously given, there can be little doubt that they are a 
substitute for social security networks and that any inequality in the initial distribution of 
land and other assets historically permitted clan elites to  capture the commanding heights 
of  politics.  Unlike the case of the more homogeneous Asian superfamilies, we have here 
smaller kinship-loyal families, sustaining cooperation within the group, but without 
altruism travelling across ethnicities.   Consequently, increased diversity leads to less 
collective action with respect to public goods and, at the aggregate level, to more 
engagement in free-riding, consequent lower growth and some of the other 
aforementioned adverse developmental outcomes.  As Avner Greif16 has also 
emphasized, citing European historical evidence, legal and political institutions foster 
intra-elite cooperation but inter-group non-cooperation.  The same asymmetry exists with 
respect to social capital, relatively strong within ethnic groups but not extending across 
these groups.  Within groups, there is bonding going on, which is relatively weak across 
groups.  Bridging across groups is, of course, difficult, even if better for optimization in 
the economic sense.  The larger the extent of diversity the more bonding, and the less 
bridging.   
 The strength of natural resource endowments represents an important dimension 
of the initial conditions.  Natural resources are an important cause of the likely 
asymmetry between different ethnic groups, depending on the vagaries of nature and 
culminating in the reduced incentive of those blessed with relative abundance to provide 
public goods to others. In Nigeria, for example, a minority ethnic group sitting on oil is 
                                                 
16 Greif, Avner, 1993.  
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demanding a larger provision of national public goods, currently creating conflict.  
Moreover, the resource-dominant groups are likely to suffer from some manifestation of 
the so-called natural resource curse, encouraging rent-seeking and weakening the 
pressure for economic or institutional reforms, all of which, of course, contributes to 
sustained unequal distributions of income, both of the vertical and horizontal type.  In this 
setting, local public goods are always preferred over national public goods and the same 
sort of asymmetries affect the overall quality of social capital which is based on intensive 
trust within rather than across groups.  As Jonathan Temple17 points out, an initial 
unequal distribution of income generally affects development negatively.  Similarly, 
Knack and Keefer18 support the position that trust is more pronounced, ceteris paribus, 
when incomes are more equally distributed. 
 Clearly, the spillover of social capital across ethnic boundaries, as well as the 
willingness to provide national public goods, depends very much on the overall 
distribution of income, both of the vertical and horizontal types, which are, to some 
extent, overlapping.  As Fosu, Bates and Hoeffler19 point out, heterogeneous societies are 
better at private goods provision, working through the market, but not very good at 
providing public goods.  Greif emphasizes that land or mineral rights are usually critical 
and are not at all helped by dysfunctional institutions which obstruct egalitarian 
outcomes.   Kinship groups can be useful in the private sector, as ethnic minorities 
benefit.  But in the public sector they can be harmful, as ethnic majorities benefit.  What 
is not clear and worthy of investigation is whether diversity improves the quality of 
private goods via an increase in variety. 
                                                 
17 Temple, Jonathan, 1998.  
18 Knack, Stephen & Keefer, Philip, 1997.  
19 Fosu, Augustin & Bates, Robert & Hoeffler, Anke, 2006.  
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All of this argues for the possible importance of decentralization.  There exists, of 
course, a large volume of literature concerning vertical decentralization, both pro and 
con, with the pros emphasizing that local communities have more information and are 
likely to contain much less ethnic diversity than those at the center, and the cons pointing 
to the greater likelihood that local elites will dominate.  Vertical decentralization is seen 
as reducing friction but may also, as some authors point out, lead to the creation of 
regional parties with less interest in public goods at the national level.  In other words, if 
too many groups form at the local level, no one is strong enough to control the state and 
no one is in a position to mobilize an “encompassing interest,” a la Mancur Olson, at the 
national level.  Diversity builds trust within groups and, while vertical decentralization is 
helpful at the local level, it reduces trust at the national level, as well as the provision of 
public goods, with results already referred to.   
Others, including Bardhan20 worry about the enhanced possibilities for corruption 
at the local level, often dominated by local elites.  But the comparison between corruption 
at central and local levels is an unresolved issue and can only be settled by empirical, 
individual country analysis.  In any case, with vertical decentralization leading to smaller 
jurisdictions exhibiting less diversity, ELF is reduced but there is a greater danger of 
polarization, i.e., a large minority opposing the central government, as pointed out by 
Yuichi Sasaoka.21  The fact is that most central governments are in the hands of a small 
elite using public goods to exercise patronage of one kind or another, mostly in the form 
of civil service employment.  
                                                 
20 Bardhan, Pranab K. & Mookherjee, Dilip, 2000.  
21 Sasaoka, Yuichi, 2007.  
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Much less attention is paid in the literature to another kind of decentralization, i.e. 
the horizontal type, shifting power from the executive, especially the finance ministry, to 
the legislative branches at all levels, as well as to the judiciary, thus providing greater 
access for minorities which can make a large difference.22  Trust can be strongly 
influenced by such an independent judiciary, a feature rarely in evidence.   
As far as I can surmise, the jury is still out with respect to the impact of 
democracy on all this.  Alesina et al23 think diversity is less serious in democracies since 
minorities are more likely to feel represented.  Barro24 finds that democracy enhances 
growth at low levels of income and depresses it at intermediate levels.  Most of the 
parliamentary systems turn out to be more stable than presidential ones, especially when 
there are many clans represented by various political parties.  With ethnic diversity more 
pronounced at the center, a diverse society benefits more from democracy and a more 
competitive political system lowers rent-seeking and increases efficiency.  Bates, Greif, 
Humphreys and Singh25 find that authoritarian governments lower TFP and thus growth 
and other dimensions of development.  On the other hand, Besley and Kudamatsu26 point 
out that autocratic regimes may be extremely good, possibly performing better than 
democracies if the electorate is sufficiently well organized.  If central government elites 
are sedentary bandits this may lead to resistance, possibly violence and lower growth, 
something that Bates, Greif et al call “a political trap.”  But if the bandits are of the 
roving type this is more likely to generate instability as public goods become exceedingly 
                                                 
22 Brancati, Dawn, 2006.  
23 Alesina, Alberto,  Devleeschauwer, Arnaud, Easterly, William, Kurlat, Sergio & Wacziarg , Romain, 
2003.  
24 Barro, Robert J, 1996.  
25 Bates, Robert H., Greif, Avner, Humphreys, Macartan & Singh, Smita, 2004.  
26 Besley, Timothy J. & Kudamatsu, Masayuki, 2007.  
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scarce and are fought over.  To conclude that democracy has little impact on growth but 
could have an impact on stability is a subject to which we shall return. 
Since the role of markets is an important issue for our project, in the private sector 
minority kinship groups benefit from its relative impersonality while, in the public sector, 
minority kinship groups are disadvantaged and majorities benefit.  Therefore, the ruling 
elite usually prefers the public sector, even if it is less efficient.  With respect to particular 
production sectors, in agriculture the majority of kinship groups usually eschew social 
capital beyond their own jurisdiction.  In industry, where minority groups are likely to 
gravitate, they benefit from the relatively larger, more urban, private activity.  Hence, for 
any given distribution of political and economic resources one might expect a more 
market oriented, arms length, impersonal system to be superior in terms of developmental 
outcomes.  However, markets may also accentuate or even create horizontal inequalities, 
especially given an initial unequal distribution of natural resources27.  Moreover, a strong 
market orientation is often associated with a lower level of public goods and thus gives 
minorities less of an obligation to respect the state in terms of taxes or any other 
indication of support.   
 
III. Diversity and Volatility 
In this section, given the fact that very little research to date has focused on the 
relationship between diversity and instability, we intend to present a number of 
preliminary hypotheses which may possibly help stimulate future research in the context 
of this project.  It is probably useful to differentiate here again among three types, the 
                                                 
27 See Anjan Mukherji, 2009:  “Stability of a Market Economy with Diverse Economic Agents,” JICA 
Research Institute Working Paper, forthcoming. 
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natural resource rich countries, those which have access to the oceans and depend on 
primary product exports and those which are landlocked and probably rank among the 
poorest.   
There can be little doubt that the unequal distribution of natural resource wealth 
across different clans can be a cause of instability, as those who are not favored by nature 
are likely to object and provoke political instability, leading to economic instability.  
There is clearly a tendency for those blessed by nature to deny public goods to the rest of 
the body politic across ethnic borders, if only to yield sporadically, when under pressure.  
This may be one reason why it has been found in several empirical  studies that the 
intermediate level of diversity, as measured by the ELF, leads to the worst case of 
political instability and, therefore, economic instability.   
Turning to primary producing countries with access to trade, terms of trade 
fluctuations can be expected to be a major source of instability, especially affecting the 
commercially advantaged clans relative to those who are less advantaged.  There is ample 
evidence that terms of trade fluctuations have very much affected growth in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and it would not require a lot of additional research to show that, within particular 
countries, the more diverse the society, the more likely that terms of trade fluctuations 
will lead to fluctuations in development, including growth, poverty and income 
distribution outcomes since they are bound to affect different groups differentially.  
Exposure to terms of trade volatility indeed is 50% higher in Sub-Saharan Africa than in 
other developing countries, after controlling for differences in incomes per capita.  Food 
insecurity, also unequally affecting different clans and currently on the rise, can similarly 
enhance economic volatility and needs to be analyzed.   
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In addition, terms of trade fluctuations are usually badly managed by 
governments.  During downturns a government typically tries to supplement demand via 
government budget deficits and monetary expansion, while, during upturns, it becomes 
very bullish and tries to enhance growth by means of foreign borrowing and, once again, 
domestic expansionary fiscal and monetary policies.  Such asymmetry over the cycle 
ultimately leads to crisis, to the imposition of import restrictions, of devaluations, and 
other sudden changes in overall policy, in a system under duress, all of which has the 
effect of generating instability.  Easterly, Kremer, Pritchett and Summers28 indicate that 
terms of trade shocks explain much of the growth fluctuations in Africa.  Country 
characteristics, of course, matter, but policies matter less than the extent of externally 
caused volatility, affecting different groups differentially.  Internal policies may add to 
the problem.  For example, export marketing boards, which are still prevalent in some 
countries, have erratic price-setting policies, often favoring the commercialized regions 
of a country and contributing to overall volatility.  To reduce such boom and bust 
oscillations one needs a democracy with relatively strong checks and balances, as, for 
example, in the Botswana diamonds case. 
With respect to all three types of African countries, including the land-locked, it 
can be assumed that frequent political turnover and regime change, which has been an 
endemic feature of much of Sub-Saharan Africa, leads not only to political but also 
economic instability.  It should not be difficult to trace the number of coups, changes in 
governments, even in ministers of finance, as causal agents in this respect.  Oscillation 
between a market orientation and a controls orientation in policy, which is often referred 
to as sub-optimal for development generally, can also be considered a likely cause of 
                                                 
28 Easterly, William, Kremer, Michael, Pritchett, Lant & Summers, Lawrence H., 1993.  
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instability, especially if these decisions are the result of continuous bargaining between 
different ethnic groups and the central government.  Power-sharing as a solution, via 
proportional representation, mutual veto and decentralization29 has not been much in 
evidence in Africa.   
If decentralization takes the usual form of delegation or deconcentration, instead 
of true devolution to local bodies in the form of fiscal decentralization, reliance on the 
center’s funds for public goods is retained.  This maintains power in the hands of those 
who control lives and is likely to lead to lobbying, continuous bargaining, uncertainty, 
conflict and economic fluctuations.  As Kimenyi30 points out, ethnic heterogeneity leads 
to the under-provision of non-excludable public goods but favors excludable patronage 
goods.  Resistance to this system by minorities risks higher instability, especially if 
combined with the central government’s inequitable tax and other direct interventions in 
favor of the elite, permitting trust to fluctuate and decline over time.  Of course, if clan 
population proportions change, especially in closely split polarized societies, another 
reason for volatility makes its appearance.  The possibility of alternating roving and 
stationary bandit regimes is not at all unrealistic and also relevant to the issue of 
instability. 
Another source of instability results from the gradual shift in much of Sub-
Saharan Africa from traditional communal land ownership, with virtually unlimited 
supplies of land, to private ownership and modern property rights, as land shortage, 
combined with population increase, leads to titling, insecurity and volatility.   
                                                 
29 Lijphart, Arend, 1977.  
30 Kimenyi, Mwangi S., 2006.  
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Other agents of globalization may well contribute to economic instability.  
Examples here include: 
a) Remittances from abroad may be aggravating horizontal and vertical 
inequality, as certain ethnic communities are more able to adapt and migrate  
abroad; and  
b) Unequal development of private capital markets, which is also likely to have 
a differential impact on different ethnic groups.  
c) Moreover, it is no secret that foreign aid agencies often play favorites, 
supporting natural resource-rich regions or politically attractive clans from 
their own foreign policy points of view, thus exacerbating both horizontal 
and vertical inequalities and causing political as well as economic 
instability. More generally, multilateral financial institutions and bilateral 
aid agencies have not been sufficiently aware of or sensitive to the impact of 
the policies they advocate and the projects they implement on the provision 
of public goods to different communities, causing horizontal inequalities.  
Aid-funded projects are likely to induce rent-seeking, favor the affluent, 
weaken the social fabric, and represent instability – creating exogenous 
shocks. 
d) NGOs, which are increasingly numerous in quantity and influential in terms 
of resources, but weak in terms of cohesion and accountability, are also 
often found to be competing with each other and jockeying for favor among 
various ethnic groups, thus making a contribution to an increase in volatility. 
 15
e)   Finally, it is generally acknowledged that global warming has been 
associated with an increased incidence of different kinds of natural disaster.  
As such exogenous shocks become more frequent they are prone to 
contribute increasingly to instability in Sub-Saharan Africa, customarily 
affecting the poorer groups as well as different ethnic groups 
disproportionately. Receding rangelands, a consequence of desertification, is 
threatening the livelihood of pastoralists. Drying rivers are reducing 
cultivatable lands.  This is causing inter-community or ethnic conflicts, and 
producing “climate change refugees.”  In other words, climate change will 
likely lead to increased economic instability in the ethnically diverse 
countries of Africa.   
 
IV. Concluding Thoughts 
In conclusion, it should be amply clear that we know a good deal about the impact 
of diversity on development, mostly on growth, but that we have relatively little evidence 
to date on the impact of diversity on instability.  Therefore this particular project seems to 
have ample room for making a substantial contribution. 
What I’ve tried to do in section II is to cite as many of the known facts and 
conclusions that have come to my attention from research in the past on the subject of the 
impact of diversity on growth and to present best guesses, not yet based on the literature, 
of what causal links between diversity and instability might be worthy of future 
examination, in Section III.  Country studies, such as pitting Uganda versus Kenya and 
Nigeria versus Botswana would certainly be indicated. 
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It is suggested that careful attention be given to decentralization which may be 
stabilizing if it is accompanied by fiscal devolution, but not if the center retains the bulk 
of resources and is able to favor culturally aligned groups and those already favored by 
nature at the local level.  Thus, the best sequence seems to be economic reforms followed 
by both political and fiscal decentralization.  Comparative studies of constitutions and the 
extent of adherence to them are relevant.  The role of foreign capital, especially foreign 
aid and NGO flows, possibly, but not necessarily, contributing to instability, needs to be 
examined.   
The basic normative issue before us is how enhanced and non volatile trust can be 
generated in the presence of diversity and how the related issue of sustainably 
encouraging the provision of national public goods can best be tackled.  This is where 
economic historians, anthropologists, political scientists and development economists can 
most usefully apply their combined talents.  As Jean-Philippe Platteau,31 aptly put it 
“how generalized trust… can be established … is probably one of the most challen
questions confronting development scholars.”  
ging 
                                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 Platteau, Jean-Phiilippe, 1994. 
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